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Wildland firefighters are often called on to make tactical decisions under stressful 
conditions in order to suppress a fire.  They frequently make these decisions based on their 
gained intuition over time, and also by considering previous specific fire experiences.  This 
assists them in anticipating future fire behavior and developing tactics designed to suppress 
the fire while avoiding entrapment.  These decisions can be hindered by human factors such 
as insufficient knowledge of surroundings and conditions, inexperience, overextension of 
resources, or loss of situational awareness.  One potential tool for assisting fire managers in 
situations where human factors can hinder decision-making is the Wildland Urban Interface 
Evacuation (WUIVAC) model, which models minimum fire travel times to create 
geographic triggers for evacuation recommendations.  Using a range of expected weather 
conditions and resource configurations, we generated a range of expected trigger buffer 
outcomes. Our objective was to use these outcomes to illustrate: (a) what spatial uncertainty 
is inherent in the geographic triggers produced by the range in expected conditions that 
contribute to fire behavior, and (b) after taking into account uncertainty, whether triggers are 
likely to be useful for rapid tactical decision-making.  
Utilizing 80 different tactical, weather, and fuel condition inputs, we demonstrated 
the use of WUIVAC for setting trigger points intended for use in planned firefighting 
operations to ensure entrapment avoidance.  These triggers were used to determine when 
firefighting resources should disengage the fire and evacuate to a safety zone, shelter in 
 
  iv
place, turn down an assignment, or reengage and change tactics altogether based on 
predicted conditions.  Using the 2007 Zaca Fire in the Los Padres National Forest, 
California as a case study, we show that WUIVAC can provide analytically driven physically-
based trigger points, and when coupled with intuitive decisions, it can assist in setting 
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1.1  Wildland Firefighter Entrapment 
Wildfire suppression often entails placing firefighting personnel in precarious, life-
threatening situations.  In addition to the difficulty associated with physically fighting fires 
(i.e. steep terrain, heat, workload), firefighters are also forced to make tactical decisions 
which can often be hindered by human factors such as insufficient knowledge of 
surroundings and conditions, inexperience, overextension of resources, or loss of situational 
awareness (Alexander & Thomas 2004; McLennan, Holgate, Omodei & Wearing 2006; 
Putnam 1995; Russo & Schoemaker 1989; Taynor, Klein, & Thordsen 1987; Weick 1993; 
Weick & Shutcliff 2001).  The risk of being trapped or overrun by a wildfire is increased 
when fire personnel are confronted with these types of barriers (Mangan 2007; Munson 
2000).   
Since the catastrophic wildfires that occurred in 1910 (Spencer 1958; Pyne 2001), 
there have been a total of 427 fatalities associated with fire fighter entrapment in the U.S. 
(NIFC 2010).  Entrapment fatalities have decreased significantly since 1995, due in part to 
doctrinal changes and implementation of risk mitigation guidelines (i.e., L.C.E.S., 10 
Firefighting Orders, and 18 Watchouts) (Cook 2004).  However, more recent fatality fires 
such as the 30-Mile (2001), Cramer (2003), and Ezperanza (2006) fires, and “near miss” fires 
such as the Little Venus (2006), and Angora fires (2007), demonstrate that entrapment risk 
still exists for fire personnel.  Fire frequency has increased in the western United States in
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recent years, resulting in larger wildfire burn areas (Mckelvey & Busse 1996; Stephens 2005; 
Westerling, Hidalgo, Cayan, & Swetnam 2006).  As a consequence, firefighters, with different 
degrees of experience and a diverse breadth of knowledge, are asked to make precise and 
accurate decisions in potentially more hazardous situations.  Hence, processes are needed to 
enable firefighters to assess and standardize their safety concerns, communicate standards 
among other personnel, and implement those standards in current and planned tactics 
(Beighley 2004).   
One potential tool for assisting fire managers in these situations is the use of 
protective triggers.  A protective trigger is when a predetermined condition is met, 
firefighting resources can execute a preidentified tactic such as evacuating to a safety zone, 
sheltering in place, turning down a tactical assignment, or changing tactics altogether and 
reengage in suppression of the fire based on new or updated predicted conditions (Greenlee, 
J. & Greenlee, D., 2003).  The Wildland Urban Interface Evacuation (WUIVAC) model was 
developed to derive geographic triggers using minimum fire travel times (Cova, Dennison, 
Kim, & Moritz 2005, Dennison, Cova, & Moritz, 2007).  Using a combination of predicted 
fire behavior conditions, resource allocations, and tactical assignments for the Zaca Fire on 
July 5th, 2007, this thesis establishes a quantifiable variability in geographic trigger 
characteristics within a range of expected conditions.  Ultimately, this information is then 
used to assess the utility of the WUIVAC model for setting trigger points in a realistic fire 
environment, when it can potentially be utilized in tactical and operational firefighting 






1.2  Objective and Research Questions 
The first objective of this research was to assess the validity of the WUIVAC model 
for utilization in future wildfire tactical operations as an evacuation threshold standardizing 
process.  In order to accomplish this, a range of expected weather conditions and resource 
configurations were processed through the model to create a range of expected outcomes. 
Our assessment was directed by the answers to the following research questions:  
1) What is the spatial uncertainty in geographic triggers produced by the range in expected 
conditions that contribute to fire behavior? 
2) After taking into account uncertainty, are triggers likely to be useful for rapid, tactical 
decision-making? 
  Our second objective was to utilize output data for highlighting opportunities for 
possible modification of the model to better suit more dynamic situations that involve 
complicated firefighting resource movement and more rapid weather changes, as well as 
smaller scale uses (i.e., single division of a fire). 
 
 
1.3  Organization of Thesis 
 
 This thesis is organized into six sections, the first of which is the Introduction.  
Section 2, the Background, is comprised of an overview of policies and procedural changes 
within the firefighting community, as well as other firefighting tactical improvements made 
over the last century that have aided in wildfire entrapment avoidance.  Secondly, it describes 
the WUIVAC model itself along with past utilization.  Lastly, an explanation of the three 
methods of attack in fire suppression is provided, with an assessment of the suppression 
situations for which the WUIVAC model may be most useful. 
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 Section 3 describes the data and methods used in the creation of the simulation 
scenario used, and explains the processing conducted.  Lastly, all metrics used to analyze and 
validate the WUIVAC model outputs are described.  Section 4 is an analysis of all the 
WUIVAC model outputs and illustrates the variation observed within the trigger buffers, 
and the effects different resource type evacuation rates have on the outputs.  Section 5 is a 
discussion on the effectiveness of the WUIVAC model for entrapment avoidance, and 
conclusions are discussed in Section 6. 
 




2.1  Wildfire Entrapment Avoidance 
A common threat that firefighters regularly face when encountering a wildfire is the 
possibility of being trapped or overrun by the fire.  Entrapments, shelter deployments, and 
burn-over fatalities occur when fire personnel are caught in situations where an escape route 
or safety zone either does not exist or has been compromised by the fire.  Inadequate 
planning, poor situational awareness, or underestimating potential fire spread increases the 
chance of being entrapped.  Most tactical decisions being made in the fire environment rely 
on precise timing, and avoiding entrapment is reliant on situational awareness, knowing 
when and where to engage a fire, and most importantly, when to disengage or change tactics 
altogether. 
There have been vast improvements in expertise, knowledge, and effectiveness of 
fire suppression tactics despite the fact that wildfires have become increasingly difficult to 
manage. As expertise in fire suppression has strengthened over the years, an understanding 
of the risks involved in suppression, and how to best mitigate these risks, has emerged.  This 
has been primarily based on previous fatality and near miss fires with an emphasis on 
entrapment avoidance, and the result has been a significant reduction in the number of 
fatalities due to burnover type incidents (Cooke 2004). 
Since the formation of tactical fire suppression organizations (e.g., Smokejumpers, 
Hotshot Crews, Civilian Conservation Corps (CCCs)) during the period of the 1930s to the
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mid 1950s, numerous organizational and doctrinal changes have been established to help 
prevent entrapments.  Cook (2004) illustrates the trends in wildfire entrapment fatalities 
from 1933 to 2003; more specifically, he addresses the research, reports, initiatives, and 
policy changes over that time period which contributed to the decline in annual wildland 
firefighter fatalities, which are explained in further depth below.  While there was slow 
assimilation of these tactical changes into firefighting practices over the last 70 to 80 years, 
the rate of firefighter fatalities across all agencies ultimately has fallen from 6.39 to 2.0 per 
year due to improved tactics (1933-2000)(Figure 2.1). 
In the 1950s, a task force studying ways to prevent firefighter injuries and fatalities 
produced one of the first reports during this period, titled the Report of the Task Force to 
Recommend Action to Reduce Chances of Men Being Killed by Burning While Fighting Fire (USDA 
1957), which was a follow-up to three fatality fires that had occurred over the previous 8 
years.  This report fostered the creation and implementation of the  “10 Standard 
Firefighting Orders” and the “13 Situations that Shout Watch Out,” which have been 
updated and nuanced over the last 50 to 60 years as knowledge has been gained from 
incidents in which an order or a particular situation has led to a fatality, entrapment, or near 
miss.  These “rules of engagement,” which are taught to every beginning wildland firefighter 
in most agencies, are still heavily used today.  In 1967 the Report of the Fire Safety Review Team: 
A Plan to Further Reduce Chances of Men Being Killed by Burning While Fighting Fire (USDA 1967) 
was provided with more recommendations, including improved safety gear, guidelines for 
constructing fireline downhill, and advocating that portable weather kits be carried on the 
fireline.  
 The concept of the common denominators in fatal or near-fatal fires was produced 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































associated with all fatality fires (e.g. on relatively small fires or deceptively quiet areas of large 
fires, in relatively light fuels, such as grass, herbs, and light brush).  Subsequently, the Report 
of the Task Force on the Study of Fatal and Near Fatal Wildland Fire Accidents (NWCG 1980) was 
produced with recommendations on how to reduce these types of incidents.  Some 
important developments that came out of the research and findings were the establishment 
of standardized wildland fire training courses and the creation of the Incident Command 
System (ICS), which has been replicated and used in many other types of disasters and by a 
multitude of other agencies (time period: 1980 to 1994).  The period from 1995 to 2000 
experienced further doctrine implementation, including Lookouts, Communication, Escape 
routes, and Communications (LCES) (Gleason 2004), and the Risk Management procedures, 
along with studies that dealt with human factors that contributed to entrapment (Close 2004; 
Putnam 1995).   These “rules of engagement,” doctrines, and practices, as Cook (2004) 
points out, have been the source of debate since their inception, but are still widely 
recognized as key elements to entrapment avoidance.   
Fire behavior research is vast and extensive; however, current research that looks 
quantitatively at entrapment avoidance is relatively scarce or nonexistent.  Butler and Cohen 
(1998) and Butler and Cohen (2004) investigated the requirements needed for an adequate 
firefighter safety zone and depicted how it is affected by the average sustained flame length 
at the edge of the safety zone.  They determined a safety zone four times larger than the 
flame height would be sufficient enough for the fire to have limited or no effect on 
resources within the safety zone (adjusted for the number of resources).  Butler, Cohen, 
Putnam, Bartlette, and Bradshaw (2000) illustrated effectiveness of various escape routes to 
safety zones, and Ruby, Leadbetter, Armstrong, and Gaskill (2003) analyzed the effect pack 
load had on the transit time and physiological processes on a firefighter utilizing an escape 
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route.  Dakin (2002) and Baxter, Alexander, and Dakin (2004) measured travel rates for 
Alberta Type I, II, and III firefighters in four common fuel types.  Cheney, Gould, and 
McCaw (2001) developed the “Dead-Man Zone” concept to represent the area between the 
handline and fire’s edge during a parallel attack, where a firefighter is suddenly in harm’s way 
if a wind change alters the flank of the fire.  
 Given the valuable yet relatively slow progress in entrapment avoidance, fatality fires 
nevertheless continue to occur, and they are a result of the same mistakes that the doctrine 
and policies mentioned above were implemented to reduce.  Although there were no 
fatalities resulting from entrapments during the 2007-2009 fire seasons, there were still 64 
cases reported where a firefighter had to deploy a shelter resulting from an entrapment 
(Figure 2.1).  Even personnel with extensive training and years of experience still fall victim 
to underestimating or not recognizing a situation that forces an entrapment.  What is needed 
is a process that creates an analytical threshold to support intuitive decision-making 
processes that aid in avoiding entrapment. 
 
2.2  WUIVAC 
  
The difficult and stressful task of making necessary risk mitigating decisions is 
heightened when important, potentially life-saving choices must be made under dynamic 
conditions.  Occurrence of other unperceived events (i.e. an incident within an incident) that 
compound a situation can further complicate decision-making (Cova, Drews, Siebeneck, & 
Musters 2009).   As explained by Cova et al. (2009), timing is crucial in making correct and 
tactically advantageous decisions.  There is a threshold at which a firefighting tactic becomes 
unsafe or too risky to pursue.  The threshold for risk differs from firefighter to firefighter, 
and even the most experienced firefighters may have artificially inflated thresholds (Beighley 
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2004).  This is most evident in tactical operations when fire behavior creates an environment 
in which the fire personnel are forced to disengage from a tactic and evacuate to a safety 
zone, deploy their shelters, or change tactics altogether.  The correct or incorrect timing of a 
decision affects the threshold of risk associated with that decision.  To help properly assess a 
risk threshold, firefighters use decision points called triggers, which can be easily identified 
or communicated, as a way to standardize the threshold (Cook 2003; Cova et al. 2005).  
Recent advances in fire behavior modeling have made it possible for researchers to 
computationally obtain these triggers for emergency evacuations or other protective action.       
Cova et al. (2005) developed WUIVAC as a warning system for fire managers and 
communities, which utilizes fire behavior modeling and GIS to derive geographic trigger 
point “buffers” around a designated protected asset (i.e., home, road, fire resource).  
WUIVAC uses a three-step process to establish trigger buffers at time intervals 
corresponding to user-designated evacuation times.  The first step incorporates the fire 
behavior model FlamMap developed by Finney (1998) to determine the rate a fire spreads in 
eight different directions across a gridded geographic landscape.  The second step involves 
establishing a rate of spread network, where the measured time of a fire’s travel from one 
cell to the next is determined.  The final step reverses the spread rate within the network and 
then uses Dijkstra’s (1959) shortest path algorithm to create trigger buffers around the 
protected asset given a specified amount of warning time (e.g., 1 hour).   
The first simulation conducted with the WUIVAC model in a realistic context was 
done by Cova et al. (2005), in which they simulated a scenario where a fire crew was forced 
to evacuate from the 1996 Calabasas Fire in Southern California by creating trigger buffers at 
15-, 30-, and 45-minute intervals for their location.  By demonstrating that the fire crew 
would have had enough time to evacuate for the modeled triggers, the authors illustrated 
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how a warning trigger could have been useful in this type of situation.  However, they do 
point out several challenges that are inherent in this method, including uncertainty within the 
model, insufficient, erroneous or dated data collection, and a lack of a standardized trigger 
point definition among fire resources.  
WUIVAC has subsequently been implemented in various other studies.  Dennison, 
Cova, and Moritz (2007) established 1-, 2-, and 3-hour trigger buffers at the community scale 
in multiple “worst case scenarios” (i.e. maximum winds). Maximum wind speed in 16 
different directions was established utilizing 8 years of previous remote automated weather 
station (RAWS) data to highlight strategically important areas of Julian and Whispering 
Pines, California.  Anguelova, Stow, Kaiser, Dennison, and Cova (2009) incorporated the 
WUIVAC model in a risk management framework designed to model fire behavior and 
pedestrian mobility in order to derive maps of wildland fire risk to pedestrians.  Their 
framework was applied to fire hazard to immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border region 
of San Diego, California.  They highlighted geographical areas of vulnerability to wildfires 
where if a migrant were to cross, they would not have ample time to evacuate.   Larsen, 
Dennison, Cova, and Jones (2011) used data from the 2003 Cedar Fire in California in an 
attempt to validate WUIVAC-modeled evacuation trigger buffers.  By adapting the model to 
adjust for changes in wind speed and direction, they created dynamic trigger buffers that 
follow the fire’s movement with more precision throughout a designated time.   Their 
WUIVAC trigger buffers allowed adequate time for evacuation and showed the genuine 
value the WUIVAC model has in community-scale evacuations. 
Preliminary research has demonstrated the potential of WUIVAC in situations where 
the weather conditions and other behavioral aspects are known, and therefore are used to fit 
the model to realistic outcomes; however, there is a need for validation of the model in more 
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micro-scale situations, such as situations where there is a dynamic, mobile facet (e.g., a 
protected asset can drive or hike to evacuate an area).  Also, further analysis of uncertainty 
within the trigger buffer outputs may aid in validating the model’s usefulness when future 
conditions can only be predicted, such as in tactical firefighting situations.    
 
 
2.3  Direct, Indirect, and Parallel Attack 
When engaging in fire suppression, there are three tactical methods of attack that 
firefighting resources utilize:  direct, parallel, or indirect.  Direct attack involves following the 
fire’s edge and suppressing the flame using water, or construction of a fireline which creates 
a fuel break between the fire and combustible vegetation, ultimately removing the fire’s heat 
and fuel source.  If the fire’s intensity is such that “going direct” is not possible, firefighting 
resources can back away 1 to 5 meters from the fire’s edge and construct a fireline, by which 
the fire runs out of combustible fuel and its intensity is decreased substantially.  This method 
is commonly referred to as parallel attack.  It is necessary to note that the modeled scenarios 
are for “indirect methods” of attack (e.g., firing operations, backfiring, line construction) 
where a fire resource will be at minimum 5 to 7 meters, and can be up to several kilometers, 
away from the uncontrolled fire edge, with unburned fuel between the two (Cheney et al. 
2001)(Figure 2.2).  From this distance a backfiring operation can be conducted, which 
involves fire personnel lighting the unburned vegetation back towards the main fire with the 
intent of stopping or changing the direction of the head fire.  Hazards associated with direct 
or parallel attack cannot be modeled with WUIVAC due to the dynamics of the model 
process, which needs ample distance from the fire.  This is due to several issues, including 
the scale used for fuel inputs into the model and the dynamic nature of a wildfire; therefore, 
this is an operational consideration in order for the trigger buffer output to have any  
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Figure 2.2: The Three Methods of Attack:  Direct, Parallel, and Indirect.  Also shown, is the 
relationship Between T1 and T2, as described by Beighley (1995) 
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usefulness (Cova et al., 2005).  Decisions made during direct or indirect methods of attack 
are often made “on-the-fly” and are reactionary to the fire’s spread, but primarily long-term 
proactive methods (i.e. indirect) work well with WUIVAC.  
  During the processes of a firing operation, fire personnel not only are in a 
precarious situation of having unburned fuel between the main fire and their location, but 
they often find themselves a measurable distance from their designated safety zone (Figure 
2.2).  In these situations an important standard operating procedure is to establish an escape 
route – a pre-identified route of travel – used by fire personnel to travel to a pre-identified 
safety zone where all fire personnel can seek shelter from risk or injury while not being 
affected by the radiative heat from the flames (Butler & Cohen, 1998 & 2004).  Determining 
an accurate threshold between the time it takes to evacuate fire personnel to the safety zone, 
and the time it takes for the fire to overtake them before they reach safety, has a margin of 
success (demonstrated in Figure 2.2).   Beighley (1995) first determined a margin of safety 
measurement, and was further illustrated by Baxter et al. (2004).  It is mathematically defined 
as follows: 
 
Safety Margin = T1 – T2 
 
where T1 is the time for the fire to reach the safety zone and T2 is the time it takes the 
firefighter to reach the safety zone. A positive safety margin indicates that a firefighter is able 
to reach the safety zone, while a negative safety margin indicates that the spreading fire 
entraps a firefighter.  Hence, the greater the positive difference between T1 and T2, the 
greater the margin of safety (Baxter et al. 2004). 
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Since wildfires occur and fluctuate depending on various types of terrain and 
vegetation that change over a given distance, and under dynamic weather factors that change 
throughout the day, many different fire spread outcomes may occur in a day’s burning 
period.  Using the “margin of safety” concept, it was important to assess whether the 
WUIVAC model would be useful in determining what the risk threshold for evacuation 
would be over an operational period for a predetermined indirect method of attack, and also 
examine whether the trigger buffers may aid in increasing the margin of safety needed when 
there is uncertainty. 
 




3.1  Study Area 
 All data used for this analysis were derived from the 2007 Zaca Fire, which occurred 
on the Los Padres National Forest, California (Figure 3.1).  The fire started on July 4th at 
approximately 11:00 am (human caused) and eventually grew to 240,207 acres (972 km2), 
thereby becoming the second largest fire in California history.  The Zaca Fire took 2 months 
to contain and was finally given a controlled status by the early part of September, requiring 
involvement from various organizations, including Santa Barbara County Fire, Los Angeles 
County Fire, Ventura County Fire, California Highway Patrol, and American Red Cross.  It 
took close to 1,000 fire personnel to finally extinguish it (CAL-Fire 2007).  Throughout the 
duration of the fire, besides the obvious threat to life, there were also threats to private 
entities, including wineries, ranches, and many homes, including pristine public lands and 
historic structures, as well as numerous wildlife and natural resources. 
 Contributing to the Zaca Fire’s rapid growth were high temperatures, irregular 
offshore winds, and a preceding 2-year drought, which lowered live fuel moisture and 
thereby contributed to the extreme fire behavior (Dennison, Moritz, & Taylor 2008).  
However, of greater significance was the steep, rugged terrain, which allowed for increased 
fire spread despite the absence of strong winds.  This terrain, which fostered unsafe working 









































































































































































































































































tactics (e.g., backfiring operations)(Keeley, Safford, Fotheringham, Franklin, & Moritz 2009; 
McDaniel 2007).  
 For the purposes of this study, the Zaca Fire provides the necessary information for 
an analysis of the WUIVAC model.  Due to its size and scope, the fire complexities in terms 
of weather, terrain, and fuel characteristics allow for a more robust assessment of uncertainty 
in WUIVAC outputs.  There are also multiple documented indirect tactical situations that 
occurred during the fire, allowing us to create a “realistic” simulation to test the model. 
 
3.2  Data 
 
Several data sources, including weather, fuels, fuel moisture, and ancillary data, were 
utilized in the creation of our scenario for the WUIVAC simulations.  All relevant data were 
processed through the WUIVAC model in the three-step process mentioned above.  Steps 
for creating the scenario and utilizing WUIVAC are described below.  
 
3.2.1  Incident Action Plan (IAP) 
An Incident Action Plan (IAP) is a central tool used for planning operations within 
an Incident Command System for any type of disaster relief.  It is a detailed written plan 
provided for the Incident Management Team, and is designed as a way to communicate and 
transfer important information (e.g., incident command structure, weather forecasts, 
operational objectives, safety plan, maps) throughout the organization.  It is provided to all 
fire resource managers on an incident, usually in conjunction with their daily briefing.  For 
the purposes of this research, it provides realistic weather and resource data that will allow 
for a more accurate fire simulation. 
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The weather data provided for the Incident Weather Forecast portion of the IAP are 
constructed by an Incident Meteorologist based on up-to-date details about the specific area 
the fire is located in, and it is what fire personal typically use in the field (although many fire 
resources take their own weather observations periodically throughout the day to measure 
more immediate changes).  It forecasts maximum temperature, minimum humidity, 20 ft 
elevation wind speed and direction, and expected changes in these parameters for the entire 
day.   
The IAP also breaks down the operational assignments for a fire into divisional 
segments for better management of resources (i.e., span of control).  Within each division, 
besides a summary of supervisor names and radio frequencies, there is a breakdown of the 
number and type of resources and their operational instructions (e.g., construct line, 
establish safety zones).  With this information, a more realistic indirect attack simulation was 
created to represent tactical situations, based on expected weather conditions and fire 
behavior, where indirect backfiring operations could occur. 
 
3.2.2  Wind Direction and Wind Speed Data 
The forecast in the IAP for July 5th called for winds out of the northeast at 4 to 8 
mph (6.4 to 12.9 kph) in the morning changing to southwest 6 to 12 mph (9.7 to 19.3 kph) 
later in the day.  Therefore, we utilized these wind directions and speed ranges for our 
models.  To simulate local, topographically driven winds, wind data went through further 
processing in WindNinja, a computer aided model for simulating terrain effects on wind at 




3.2.3  Fuel Moisture Data 
 Relative humidity (RH), a percentage describing how much moisture is currently in 
the air relative to the amount of moisture the air needs to become saturated, is vital to the 
vegetation’s availability to burn, affecting the intensity of a fire (Countryman, 1972).  RH has 
a greater impact on smaller and lighter fuels, 0 to 2.5 cm in diameter (1 hr and 10 hr fuels), 
and a weaker affect on fuels 2.5 cm to 7.6 cm in diameter (100 hr fuels), due to their fast 
absorption and evaporation properties, thus creating variation diurnally as warming and 
cooling occur (Pyne, 1996).  An IAP is required to have a predicted range in RH for the day 
for the firefighting resources, and this measurement and range in a fuel’s availability to burn 
is an essential part in fire behavior predictions.  However, the FlamMap fire behavior 
portion of the model requires a dead fuel moisture percentage for 1 hr, 10 hr, and 100 hr 
fuel time lag classes rather than a RH. 
 In order to establish the best fuel moisture prediction range for our measurements 
for July 5th, we utilized the Los Prietos RAWS, which was the closest station to the Zaca Fire 
at the time of our simulation.  We acquired the gravimetric 10 hr fuel moisture low and high 
averages for the operation period of 07:00 to 19:00 on July 4th to predict the following day’s 
values.  The range for July 4th had a high fuel moisture of 8% early in the morning, and a 
fuel moisture of 5% at the lowest point that day.  Due to the previous three day’s 
observations having a consistent range of approximately 5 to 8%, we utilized these high and 
low percentages for the 1 hr, 10 hr, and 100 hr fuel model inputs for our predicted range in 
fuel moistures on July 5th, confident that we would have an appropriate approximation.  In 
addition, the live fuel moisture content for the fire behavior model was set at 60% based on 
typical seasonal values for chaparral vegetation.  
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3.2.4  Fuels and Topography Data 
All elevation, aspect, slope, and fuel characteristic (canopy cover, height, base height, 
bulk density) data were collected and organized through the Landscape Fire and Resource 
Management Planning Tools (LANDFIRE)(Reeves, Ryan, Rollins, & Thompson 2009; 
Rollins 2009).  LANDFIRE is a multiagency project that provides a framework for universal 
mapping of wildland fuels, vegetation, and fire regime data at 30 m spatial resolutions.  
Products that are created by LANDFIRE have been shown to work well with fire behavior 
models such as FlamMap and FARSITE (Finney 2004; Finney 2006).  An ArcGIS tool is 
provided on their website (LANDFIRE 2010), which allows the user to select an area of 
interest and upload specific data relatively quickly.  The tool then creates a land cover file 
(.lcp) with the specific ancillary data that the FlamMap fire behavior model requires.   
 
3.3  WUIVAC Processing 
Maximum spread rates were calculated for all scenarios, which are defined below, 
using the FlamMap fire behavior model.  The FlamMap software package was designed to 
approximate fire behavior given constant environmental conditions over a given 
geographical space (Finney 2006; Stratton 2006).  The rate of the fire’s spread was calculated 
using equations developed by Rothermal (1972), and then a two-dimensional spread rate was 
developed using relationships between spread rate and fire shape (Anderson 1983).  These 
fire behavior calculations were finally used to calculate a rate of spread for each independent 
pixel over raster topography (Finney 1998).  By including our ancillary, weather, and fuel 
data, the rates of spread and the azimuth of the maximum rate of spread were calculated for 
the relevant geographic area on the Zaca fire at 100 x 100 30 m pixels (9 km2).  FLAMMAP 
outputs were then processed by an Interactive Data Language (IDL) program that created a 
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rate of spread for each cell in eight different directions, which were expressed in meters per 
second.  After this process, the output cells were then linked to surrounding cells and 
adjacent spread rates were combined to form arcs between cell centers representing travel 
time.   
The main output from the WUIVAC model was a trigger buffer around a protected asset 
(any designated cell) that was based on how long the fire would take to reach that asset given 
the expected fire behavior  (e.g., 15, 25, 45 minutes).  This was accomplished by using 
Dijkstra’s (1959) shortest path algorithm, which can be applied to a reversed fire-spread arc 
travel time network, effectively traveling outward until selected time is reached (i.e. a fire 
burning in reverse).  The result was output trigger buffers of different sizes and shapes, 
which can be accessed in ESRI’s ArcGIS software.  Finally, once a network-based 
representation of the fire-spread rate was constructed, trigger buffers, based on our 
calculated evacuation times, were developed for the tactical scenarios described in the 
following section. 
 
3.4  Scenario Creation 
Our first objective was to show how well the model performs in tactical decision-
making under changing conditions; therefore, it was imperative that we created a tactical 
firefighting scenario as realistic as possible.  Using the Zaca Fire’s size (approximately 600 
acres) and approximate location on July 5th, as well as resource availability via the IAP for 
that day, we determined that there existed three possible locations from which indirect 
pieces of line could be constructed and/or utilized for that day’s operations (Figure 3.2: 
























































































use available resources to  “construct line to Division Y.”  In order to accomplish this using 
indirect methods, things we considered were: accessibility by firefighters on foot, fire engines 
(Type 3 – 500 gallons or larger), or “dozers” (D6 or larger) along the entire fuel break, 
adequate safety zones for personnel to evacuate to (should the fire threaten their safety), and 
the plausibility of the tactic being implemented in time.  Ultimately, we developed three 
different locations – Containment Lines A, B, and C – as indirect options to construct or 
improve upon, which would have a high success rate for establishing a fuel-break and 
subsequently be used to implement a backfiring operation.  
Containment Lines A, B, and C were used as the escape routes going to and from 
each safety zone due to their being the most devoid of vegetation and other debris, which 
could end up hindering an evacuee.  We established five escape route options for the three 
containment lines (Figure 3.2), and all escape routes and modes of travel are described in 
Table 3.1.  Containment Line C is a U.S. Forest Service road, which is accessible by Type 3 
engines and on-the-ground firefighters traveling by foot.  Containment Lines A and B utilize 
undeveloped, often steep ridgelines which have to be improved with dozers, thus being only 
accessible by foot with no engine support.   
For both Containment Lines A and B, adequate safety zones are located at both the 
north and south ends of their lines.  Containment Line C, however, has only one safety zone 
located to the south and thus only one directional option for evacuation, which we 
designated R1.  Since there are two safety zone options for both Containment Lines A and 
B, we created two different route scenarios.  For Containment Line B, we split the line 
equally in two and created routes R2N and R2S.  For Containment Line A, one route (R3) 
extends from the most southern safety zone to the most northern, and another route (R4) 






3.4.1  Evacuation Travel Rates 
A rate-of-travel was determined for each of the three transportation types at a 0 
percent slope: on-foot (OF) = 90 m/minute, in an engine (EG) = 650 m/minute, and in a 
dozer (DZ)= 65 m/minute.  We assumed that an engine could travel at 650 m/min on a 
forest service road and still have the control to maintain its safety.  We based the on-foot 
rate on the Baxter et al. (2004) study of firefighter mean travel rates for a Type III crew on 
short grass while carrying both a pack and tool.  They recorded a mean rate of 93 m/min, 
which we rounded down to 90 m/min for a more conservative evacuation time.  For the 
dozer, we estimated that it would travel 25 to 30% slower on flat ground than someone on 
foot.  To adjust the travel rate for changes in terrain, Tobler’s (1993) Hiking Function and 
the Path Distance tool in the ArcGIS software were used to create a realistic travel time for 
each mode of transportation back to the designated safety zone for each raster cell along the 
escape route.  All times were rounded up to the nearest whole number. 
For our scenario, the trigger buffers need to account for the firefighting resource at 
any point along the designated escape route.  Thus, our five escape routes were used to 
Escape Route Type Modes of  Travel Containment Line
 R1 U.S. Forest Service Road Engine, On Foot A
 R2N Dozer Line Dozer, On Foot
 R2S Dozer Line Dozer, On Foot
 R3 Dozer Line Dozer, On Foot




Table 3.1:  The Five Evacuation Routes and Modes of Travel for 
Each Containment Line.
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create five rasterized masks for extraction of evacuation times.  As indicated in Figure 3.3, 
the value in each cell represents the travel time needed to reach the safety zone.  Each cell is 
treated as a protected asset in order for a buffer to be calculated for each cell based on its 
travel time.  A union is then formed of all buffers created for each cell on the entire escape 
route.  The resulting 10 buffers are designated as follows:  Route 1 Engine (R1EN), Route 1 
Foot (R1FT), Route 2 North Foot (R2NFT), Route 2 North Dozer (R2NDZ), Route 2 
South Foot (R2SFT), Route 2 South Dozer (R2SDZ), Route 3 Foot (R3FT), Route 3 Dozer 
(R3DZ), Route 4 Foot (R4FT), Route 4 Dozer (R4DZ).  Figure 3.4 illustrates the 
relationship the relative max travel times for each route and mode of transportation. 
 
3.4.2  Model Inputs 
For our July 5th study area on Division C we have eight different fire behavior 
scenarios that represent the predicted range and variability of conditions for that day (Table 
3.2).  For dead fuel moisture (FM) we have a high value of 8% and a low value of 5%.  Wind 
direction is predicted out of the northeast (NE) and the southwest (SW) based on the IAP.  
For the NE wind direction there is a wind speed range of 4 mph to 8 mph, and for the SW 
wind direction there is a wind speed range of 6 mph to 12 mph.  As specified above, we 
established five evacuation routes and two travel methods for each route for a total of ten 
tactical scenarios.  Including the ranges of wind and RH inputs, 80 scenarios that span the 
range in tactics and predicted fire behavior conditions for our operational period. 
These final 80 scenarios were processed through the WUIVAC model to assess the 

























































1 FM5 - NE - 4mph
2 FM5 - NE - 8mph
3 FM5 - SW - 6mph
4 FM5 - SW - 12mph
5 FM8 - NE - 4mph
6 FM8 - NE - 8mph
7 FM8 - SW - 6mph
8 FM8 - SW - 12mph
 Weather and Fuel Inputs
 
 





















1. Area within each buffer 
2. Maximum, minimum, and mean distances between the protected resource and the 
edge of the buffer 
3. Mean difference in the distance between different buffers  
4. Distance measures in specific directions 




















Model Processing Workflow 
Figure 3.5:  Workflow Process for our 80 Tactical and Fire Behavior Condition Scenarios. 
 
4  RESULTS 
 
 Once all 80 tactical and fire behavior condition combinations were processed, the 
resulting output geographic trigger buffers (Figures 4.1 through 4.8) were used to calculate 
statistics.  Qualitative and quantitative analyses show discernable patterns between scenarios, 
and these patterns are varied depending upon the input conditions. This was expected, and 
the observed variation between trigger buffers demonstrates the usefulness of trigger buffer 
application in tactical situations involving firefighting resources.  Total area, direction, and 
mean and max distances of the resulting trigger buffers were measured to assess variability, 
and subsequent uncertainty.  
 As illustrated in Figures 4.1 through 4.8, a comparison between the 5% and 8% dead 
fuel moisture inputs for each scenario shows the total area of an escape route’s trigger buffer 
increases as fuel moisture percentage is decreased.  Wind speed and direction also have a 
strong influence on a trigger buffer increasing in area, but wind speed, rather than wind 
direction, dictates where the majority of the trigger buffer’s area resides.  Also influential in 
dictating trigger buffer area is a route’s evacuation time.  The total area of a buffer increases 
as time needed to evacuate increases (i.e. evacuation time: R1EN = 20 min vs. R3DZ = 175 
min).  As expected, when a resource travels toward the safety zone, a larger portion of the 
trigger buffer area was present around the safety zone to allow the resource safe travel from 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  A visual comparison between Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 best demonstrates the effect 
travel time has on the output trigger’s buffers.  The outputs for R1FT (Figure 4.1) are all 
distinctly larger buffers than those of R1EN (Figure 4.2).  Travel on foot was much slower 
than traveling in an engine; thus, the buffer needed to be large enough to adjust for this time  
difference.  R1EN’s buffers are smaller and tight to the road, giving the resource greater time 
to complete the tactical objective safely than on foot traffic would have.  We can also 
observe the majority of the trigger buffer on the south side of the road, which indicates fuel 
characteristics and wind direction make fire spread from that direction more of a threat.  The 
trigger buffer difference between on foot travel and engine travel was the most noticeable, 
but when we compared on foot travel to dozer travel in all the other scenarios, there was less 
of a dramatic change in size and shape due to the travel times being closer together.  
A longer travel time results in an increase in size and shape of a trigger buffer.  The 
relationship was evident in a comparison between R2S (Figures 4.3 and 4.4) and R3 (Figures 
4.5 and 4.6) for both DZ and FT travel.  The travel times were approximately 40% to 50% 
less for R2S than for R3.  Hence, when R3’s network and subsequent trigger buffer was 
computed, fuel and terrain inputs to the south, which were conducive to increasing fire 
spread rate, were incorporated into the model.  The result was a substantially larger trigger 
buffer area to the south for R3, as well as a sizable difference in max edge distance 
measurements between the two routes, and all R3’s trigger buffers are overlapping the fire. 
One distinctive feature of R4’s trigger buffers was the peninsula like feature on the 
northeastern part of the buffers (Figure 4.7 and 4.8).  This distinct shape also occurred in the 
southern portion R2N and R2S output buffers (Figure 4.3 and 4.4) and more predominately 
in R3 (Figure 4.5 and 4.6).  This phenomenon was a result of the model adjusting for terrain 
and vegetative features that are in alignment for rapid-fire spread.  Fire tends to burn faster 
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up hill; the steeper the slope the faster fire travels, due to conductive and radiant processes 
of a flame front, which ultimately preheats the fuel bed in front of the fire making the 
vegetation more receptive to burning.  Hence, this feature of the trigger buffer was located 
on slopes with a receptive fuel bed for faster fire spread adjacent to ridges where fire runs 
are more intense, which indicates correct allocation of a buffer’s area by the model. 
In all 10 tactical scenarios, weather and fuel condition FM8 – NE – 4 mph produced 
the least total area, whereas FM5 – SW – 12 mph had the largest area, resulting in an average 
of 52% (+/- 7%) increase in total area as the conditions for fire spread increased.  This 
increase was attributed more to wind speed than any other factor.  Fuel type and location, 
which as mentioned above does have an affect on area (albeit minimal in most cases), plays a 
stronger role in affecting a trigger buffer’s shape.  This occurrence is best expressed in a 
comparison between R2NFT and R2NDZ in Figures 4.3 and 4.4; each mode had a different 
travel time, but each had the same approximate total area as well as trigger buffer output 
shape.  This can be attributed to the Sisquoc River that is located north of the route, which 
acts as a large barrier for the fire spread model.    
The Sisquoc River’s location also blunted the increase in trigger buffer area and 
shape for all of R4’s scenarios.  Travel time for both R4 and R3 were very close, and their 
location is exactly the same, yet when we compare Figures 4.7 and 4.8 to Figure 4.5 and 4.6, 
their trigger buffers are considerably different.  Even though the buffer’s total area should be 
allocated differently over the terrain, due to the travel time difference at each end of both 
routes, we might expect their total area to be closer in measurement. However, this was not 
the case, as fire spread would be halted significantly at the river. 
We were also able to observe from the outputs what containment lines, and 
conditions associated with them, will likely be compromised before tactics are even 
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implemented.   As shown in Figure 4.5 and 4.6, based on the evacuation time, all R3’s trigger 
buffers for each travel mode are overlapped with the fire’s edge.  Given this result, which is 
examined in greater depth below, implementing Containment Line A with R3 as an escape 
route would put resources in harm’s way before construction on the line was completed, and 
therefore it would not have a high success rate for constructing an indirect handline.  Time 
and resources would subsequently be best allocated elsewhere.  This would also be a 
consideration with trigger buffers R1FTFM5-SW12 mph, R1FTFM8-SW12 mph, 
R2SDZFM5-12 mph, R2SDZFM8-12 mph, R4DZFM8-SW12 mph, and R4DZFM5-NE8 
mph and SW12 mph.  In comparison, all trigger buffer outputs for R1EN, R2NFT, R4FT 
and R2NDZ had no contact whatsoever with the fire.   This is mainly due to their location 
and travel times, which ultimately may influence margin of safety considerations for that July 
5th’s planned tactics. 
 Travel time and wind speed had the greatest impact on trigger buffer distance from 
the protected resource.  For instance, the mean distance and the maximum mean distance 
for the range of trigger buffers for R3DZ, which had the slowest travel time of 175 min, was 
528 m and 1486 m.  Conversely, R1EN, which had the fastest travel time of 20 min, had a 
mean distance of 32 m and a maximum mean distance of 128 m.  Even though there was a 
wide range in ten tactical trigger buffer distances, this was the relationship between travel 
time and trigger buffer distance we expected to observe.  As travel time increases, we 
inferred that the trigger buffer edge distance needed to activate a well-timed decision would 
need to increase proportionally. 
While there was quite a large variation in the mean and mean max distance from 
protected resource to trigger buffer edge across the 10 tactical scenarios, the difference of 
the mean distance to mean max distance across the ten tactical scenarios was significantly 
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less dramatic.  By observing a ratio of the mean and the max mean trigger buffer distances 
for each of the tactical situations, we observed a strong correlation between the growth of 
trigger buffer distances as the range of input conditions increases throughout the range of 
travel modes and times.  The ratio of the mean/mean max for all ten scenarios was .338 
(+/- .033).  The ratio was even stronger when travel modes are aggregated by travel mode.  
For on foot travel, the ratio was .343 (+/- .009), and for dozer travel it was .354 (=/- .009).  
From these results, given a range of conditional inputs, we can assume strong continuity 
between the range in the total area and distance of trigger buffer outputs, as the 
transportation modes and times are changed. 
Both wind direction and speed, as well as vegetation location and type, influenced 
the direction and distance of the 80 trigger buffers.  As illustrated in Figure 4.9, even though 
Containment lines A and B run mainly north to south and Containment Line C runs 
northwest to southeast, the maximum extents for the trigger buffers run in a southwest to 
northeast direction, which was to be expected.  The trigger buffers would need to be 
extended in the direction of oncoming winds, which affect fire’s spread, in order to establish 
enough time for resource evacuation.  Although there was a northeast to southwest 
trajectory of max extent, all eight trigger buffers for each of the 10 tactical scenarios are 
mostly grouped together rather than split in half due to the two different wind directions.  
Additionally, most groups extended toward the southwest.  We concluded that this was most 
likely due to terrain and fuels creating stronger fire behavior outputs in the southwest 
direction, and thus pulling the direction of the trigger buffers in that direction.  
Subsequently, as time increases across the ten tactical scenarios, the resulting trigger buffers 









































































































































































































































 Tactical decision-making in highly stressful and time sensitive situations is extremely 
challenging and can often be problematic, potentially leading to unsuccessful or incorrect 
results (United States Fire Administration 2002).  The wildland fire environment is an 
incubator of such stressful scenarios and risk is inherent in many tasks conducted by 
wildland firefighters.  Analytical processes have the ability to aid in what is most often an 
intuitive decision process conducted in tumultuous situations by firefighters with a wide 
range of experience, knowledge, and capabilities.  A firefighter’s intuition can be altered or 
compromised by human factors such as insufficient knowledge of surroundings and 
conditions, inexperience, overextension of resources, or loss of situational awareness. 
Uncertainty and limitations associated with GIS and fire behavior models are well 
documented (Alexander 2004; Zhang & Goodchild 2002), and decisions based solely on 
model outputs are unwarrantable in most tactical situations involving fire suppression.  For 
example, problems would arise if the trigger buffer size needed for evacuation fell beneath 
the cell resolution size(in this case 30 m), or the fuel and weather conditions were outside the 
range of the predicted conditions.  However, these types of errors can be overcome by 
conservative interpretation of predicted conditions paired with accurate-as-possible model 
outputs. 
 What we demonstrate here is an area where both analytical and intuitive decision-
making processes can be coupled together to make effective, efficient, and more 
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advantageous decisions.  This process has the possibility to ensure more accurate decisions, 
with the firefighter’s safety as the highest priority.  For the purpose of this study, we 
constructed scenarios based on resource availability, in addition to weather and fuel 
conditions predicted for Division C on the Zaca Fire for July 5th.  Fuel and terrain models 
were also retrieved from LANDFIRE for our study area.  We developed a methodology for 
how to calculate a travel time for different firefighting resources, which adjusts for changes 
in slope, utilizing a modified Tobler’s Hiking Function.  To determine uncertainty, these 
methods worked well for consistency and keeping the scenario realistic as possible, but if the 
WUIVAC model were to be used in future tactical situations, planning combat and modeling 
adjustments for containment lines, escape route travel times, designated safety zones, and 
resource capabilities would theoretically be determined and assessed by fire managers on the 
ground and communicated to the person running the model.  Since weather conditions are 
dynamic, real time weather observations taken on site at designated intervals could also be 
communicated, and models would be updated to match current conditions, ultimately 
decreasing uncertainty.  We only tested for a range of expected conditions for that day, so 
we are unable to address the characteristics of the trigger buffers that might occur under 
more extreme conditions.  For example high wind gusts above the predicted wind speeds, 
which would affect the output buffer, were not accounted for in the model.  Having 
regularly updated weather observations, as well as having conservative estimates of travel 
times and weather and fuel conditional predictions would possibly help regulate this 
uncertainty. 
Based on the trigger buffers resulting from the 80 scenarios, WUIVAC was able to 
show usefulness in tactical decision-making.  We were able to observe how the range of fire 
behavior conditions for that day impacted the resulting trigger buffers and the variability 
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associated with them.  This allowed us to account for, and subsequently plan for and assess, 
the potential dynamic changes in wind, fuel moisture, etc. for a whole operational period.  A 
trigger buffer’s size and shape varied strongly between the 10 routes, due to differences in 
travel time.  However, adjusting for travel time, the variation between the high and low 
weather and fuel conditional inputs across the ten scenarios was minimal, which indicates 
stronger model output consistency.  
As mentioned above, travel time is influential in dictating trigger buffer total area and 
shape by allowing the model to take into consideration more terrain and fuel characteristics, 
which may or may not have properties that allow for more rapid fire spread.  The WUIVAC 
model creates a network based on minimal fire spread time for each 30 m cell in our study 
area, which it then uses to create a buffer based on the designated evacuation time.  The 
larger the evacuation time needed, the larger the buffer size and edge distance needs to be.  
As the buffer’s edge moves farther out from the protected resource (i.e., containment line) 
due to time needed to evacuate, the more fuel and terrain characteristics the model is able to 
consider.  These characteristics may or may not be conducive to increased fire spread, and 
our resulting buffers highlight this relationship (see Figure 4.9).  Understanding this 
relationship may also help a firefighting resource in assigning a trigger buffer edge to a real 
world feature (e.g., ridge, river, road) for purposes of a trigger point.  Adjustments by the fire 
manager or resource can be made to the trigger point to accommodate their understanding, 
or lack of understanding, of the fire dynamics connected to an area.  Conservative or 
aggressive trigger points could be determined, in which the model gives a reference point 
with which to start.  This conceptual point of reference would aid in the understanding of 
pre-identified evacuation thresholds, or other tactical plans, for a range of experience from 
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the novice firefighter to most seasoned, and this link of understanding, or discussion point, 
between the two would serve as a possible framework for better communication. 
As shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, based on the evacuation time, all R3’s trigger 
buffers for each travel mode are overlapped with the fire’s edge.  Given this result, 
implementing Containment Line A with R3 as an escape route has an extremely small if not 
nonexistent margin of safety, and would put resources in harm’s way before construction on 
the line was completed, and therefore it would not have a high success rate for indirect 
handline.  Time and resources should subsequently be allocated elsewhere.  Once again, a 
consideration with trigger buffers R1FTFM5-SW12 mph, R1FTFM8-SW12 mph, 
R2SDZFM5-12 mph, R2SDZFM8-12 mph, R4DZFM8-SW12 mph, and R4DZFM5-NE8 
mph and SW12 mph is also warranted.  These Containment Lines would still be viable for 
indirect tactics, although tactical change would need to be implemented, or at the very least 
considered, when wind speeds increased.  Efficiency in decision-making can be improved 
when tactics are analyzed in advance, given all relevant input (i.e., handline location, travel 
time for resources, weather and fuel conditions).  If a resource is using weather thresholds 
(i.e., wind speed increase or direction change) for their trigger point, the WUIVAC output 
trigger buffer could aid in determining what that threshold might be.  Also, for the purposes 
of indirect attack, we were able to see clearly which containment lines and resource 
allocations would have a more successful outcome for that day.  This also demonstrates 
WUIVAC’s ability to increase efficiency when decisions involving firefighter resource 





5.1  Shelter-In-Place Trigger Buffer 
 An additional concept we discovered in this process was the idea of a shelter-in-place 
(SIP) trigger buffer, which is illustrated in Figure 5.1.  When we overlay a conditional buffer 
(e.g. FM5-SW12 mph) of R4 with the same conditional trigger buffer of R3, the intersection 
of the two is an area where both the northern and southern safety zones are unattainable by 
the fire resource, and the best option for the escaping fire fighter is to SIP.  Just like the 
trigger point buffer, this “shelter buffer” could be used to assign a geographical feature, 
where if the fire spread breaches the edge, then a predetermined decision is made. 
The potential for this concept in tactical decision-making is two fold.  First, the fire 
resource could use time that would normally be dedicated to traveling the remaining distance 
of the escape route, which in theory would end poorly, to pick the best immediate shelter 
and prep before the burnover occurs (e.g., remove vegetation, set a backfire), providing 
greater potential for survival.  This trigger would be communicated and understood prior to 
the suppression tactic being implemented, and it should be part of that resource’s situational 
awareness.  When stress associated with an approaching fire front, rapid evacuation, and 
fatigue were present, the point of no return would be predetermined and not decided on-
the-fly under hectic conditions.  Second, when planning the suppression tactics for an 
operational period, a fire manager could further assess risk and the margin of safety 
associated with a proposed tactic.  A greater ratio between an evacuation trigger buffer and 











































































































































































































































6  CONCLUSION 
 
Eighty scenarios, which span a range of tactics and predicted fire behavior 
conditions for the July 5th operational period, were derived in order to analyze the 
uncertainty associated with output trigger buffers.  A qualitative and quantitative analysis 
provides a clear depiction of how containment line location, fire behavior conditional inputs 
(e.g., fuel moisture, wind inputs, terrain) and evacuation time control the size, shape, and 
direction of a trigger buffer.  Travel time was the most important factor in determining 
trigger buffer area and extent for the 80 scenarios.  Unlike wind and fuel moisture, travel 
time and distance to safety zone can be predicted with greater certainty.  Overall, uncertainty 
linked to our output trigger buffers was minimal under the tested ranges of conditions, 
allowing for a firefighter resource to use them as a reference in planning indirect tactical 
objectives.  More specifically, the WUIVAC model preformed as we anticipated.  According 
to our research, uncertainty associated with the range of inputs would have little hindrance in 
developing trigger points based on a geographical location.  Furthermore, the margin of 
safety was measurable, as demonstrated in our results, which has the potential to aid 
decision-making by assessing and determining risk thresholds. 
Nevertheless, additional research is needed to assess the use of WUIVAC in 
different fuel and terrain types along with applying the model to different tactical scenarios.  
Further analysis should also include determining the uncertainty associated with buffers 
generated from observed conditions in intervals throughout the day (i.e., every hour).  As
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model processing times increase, a more real-time model could be used in fire operations at 
the divisional level, where the Division Officer would be able to get on-the-spot trigger 
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